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TORTS

S

INCE the word "tort" is a term applied to a miscellaneous
and more or less unconnected group of civil wrongs amounting to socially unreasonable conduct, division of the subject into
smaller topics lends itself to better understanding of the major
decisions of the past year. Therefore consideration of the significant cases of 1954 will be treated under the following topics:
Assumption of Risk, Negligence-Standard of Care, Intentional
Infliction of Mental Anguish, Misrepresentation, Conversion, Negligence, and Contributory Negligence as a Defense. Primary emphasis is placed on whether a particular decision modifies or
enlarges previous case law on the point, whether the decision follows the so-called "majority rule," and the degree to which the
rule evidenced by the decision is limited to the precise facts involved in the case.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK

The defense of assumption of risk rests on the plaintiff's consent to take his chances on ordinary risks of harm created by the
defendant. Technically, in a true assumption of risk case, the
defendant is not negligent at all for he simply owes no duty to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff may be using great care himself and
be denied recovery when he enters into performance in the face
of a known and appreciated danger with a reasonable alternative
available to him. The common law rule was that an employee
assumed all of the ordinary risks of his employment, as well
as the risk of any extraordinarily dangerous conditions known or
obvious to him and against which he does not protest.1 Most
American and English writers have vigorously attacked this view,2
protesting that the only reasonable alternative available in most
cases is to quit work and look for another job. Criticism of the
doctrine culminated in passage of the many workmen's compensation acts and the ultimate adoption of the Federal Employer's
Liability Act,' the latter greatly modifying the defense of assumption of risk which was previously available to the employer. In
1 Butler v. Frazee, 211 U.S. 459 (1908).
2 3 LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT § 960

8 45 U.S.C. § 51.

(2d ed. 1913), for example.
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the face of the tide, however, assumption of risk has a staunch
defender in the personage of the Texas Supreme Court. In McKee
v. Patterson4 a carpenter slipped on a slick floor in a school gym
and injured himself. Although the general contractor was negligent in finishing the floor before completion of the carpentry
work, the court held the contractor was not liable to the carpenter,
either on the basis that the latter had assumed the risk or that
the contractor owed no duty to the carpenter.5 In holding the
carpenter had a reasonable alternative open, the court stated the
need for employment was "not such economic compulsion as to
render involuntary the workman's employment in the face of a
known danger." Although adhering to common law precedent,
the court was careful to point out that the carpenter had previously
collected under the local workmen's compensation statute. Perhaps
the court felt that one recovery was enough.
Closely allied to the assumption of risk cases are the so-called
"rescue" cases. Those who rush in to save the life or property of
another have not assumed the risk if the only reasonable alternative is to allow the damage to be done. It has long been held
that efforts to protect the personal safety of another person will
not supercede the defendant's liability, regardless of whether the
rescuer is to be regarded as a foreseeable intervening force. To
quote Mr. Justice Cardozo, "Danger invites rescue.., the emergency begets the man." 6 The Oklahoma court recently had occasion
to approve the language of Cardozo in Curtis v. Shell Pipe Line
Corp.7 The defendant dug a ditch on the plaintiff's land under a
right-of-way agreement, but negligently left the ditch unguarded.
The plaintiff's cow fell into the ditch, and the plaintiff suffered injuries in attempting to extricate the panic-stricken cow. The court
held the owner of the cow could recover for his injuries sustained
while trying to get the cow out and minimize the damages, so long
as he was not negligent himself. No effort was made to persuade
4 ------ -Tex

............
271 S.W. 2d 391 (1954).
5 For a distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence
Texas, see 29 TEXAS L. Rav. 268, which suggests assumption of risk only applies
the master-servant relation. All else comes under the rule that no duty is owed
someone where the danger is open and obvious. Query, under the technical idea
assumption of risk, are not the two synonymous?
6Wagner v. International R. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
7 ........
Okla .............
265 P. 2d 488 (1954).
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the court that there may be a distinction between trying to rescue
a person and trying to save only a chattel. Some states, including
Texas, insist that a person trying to rescue property may not
recover for any injuries sustained in the attempt, for his act is
considered an intervening act relieving the defendant of liabiilty.
This illogical distinction has been discarded by most courts. The
better view was aptly stated by Judge Andrews in Wardrop v.
Santi Moving Co.' that "undoubtedly more risks may be taken to
protect life than to protect property without involving the imputation of negligence, but a reasonable effort may be made even in
the latter case."
NEGLIGENCE-STANDARD

OF CARE

Generally, in a negligence suit a doctor is entitled to be judged
according to the standards of the school of medical thought which
he professes to follow.9 In Porter v. Puryear ° the Texas court
held that "[a]patient has no cause of action against his doctor
for malpractice unless he proves by a doctor of the same school
of practice that a diagnosis or treatment was negligent and the
proximate cause." This concept of expert testimony was broadened to include testimony from a doctor from a different school
of practice "where the particular subject of inquiry is common
to and equally recognized and developed in all fields of practice
and where it relates to the manner of use of electrical or mechanical appliances in common use in all fields of practice." This
means, for example, that an X-ray technician may now be an
expert witness against a doctor in a malpractice suit. Other states
generally allow expert testimony of physicians of other schools
or experts in other lines when that testimony bears on a point as
to which the principles of the two schools concur (diagnosis,
dangers of X-rays, etc.). 11
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL ANGUISH

It is only in comparatively recent years that courts have recognized the intentional infliction of mental disturbance as a tort.
8233 N.Y. 227, 135 N.E. 272 (1922).

9 Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769, 238 N.W. 529 (1931).
10 ----- Tex.----, 262 S.W. 2d 933 (1954).
11 See collection of cases in 41 Am. Jur., Physicians and Surgeons § 130.
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Usually only acts of flagrant nature are compensated. One reason
is that the courts are afraid of opening a "wide door" through
which a stream of litigation will flow. Another is that frequently
there is trouble in arriving at the correct amount of damages.
However, large sums have been awarded for mental suffering
when accompanied by a broken neck or back or leg, and the problem of proof of damage for the mental suffering has not been
overly vexatious. Some courts have looked for technical batteries,
or false imprisonment, or "impact." Others have faced the issue
squarely and held the defendant liable for infliction of mental
disturbance alone. 12 Texas showed an early tendency to allow
recovery for this type of injury when the defendant struck a third
person and negligently inflicted mental suffering on the plaintiff. 8
However, in the "finance company cases," as recently as 1953 the
court held there could be no cause of action for intentional inflic.
tion of mental suffering alone.' 4 The court simply was afraid of
fraud. But the Texas court did an about-face in 1954 in Duty v.
General Finance Co., et al., 5 which involved a suit by borrowers
for mental anguish and injuries caused by a finance company's
daily telephone calls, accusations in the presence of neighbors
that the plaintiffs were deadbeats, threats to cause the plaintiffs
to lose their jobs, requests to the plaintiffs' employer to make
them pay, flooding the mail with letters and telegrams, etc. The
only injuries sustained were headaches, upset stomachs, loss of
weight and sleep. The court held that a cause of action existed,
distinguishing earlier cases wherein no physical injuries were
alleged.
The Retail Merchant's Association of Texas as amicus curiae
feared that the decision would hamper banks, department stores,
professional men, etc., in the collection of debts. In an attempt
to placate them, the court intimated that liability would be limited to outrageous conduct. Only a "resort to every cruel device
which his cunning can invent in order to enforce collection" will
result in a bludgeoning by the court.
12 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F. 2d 62 (App. D.C. 1939).
13Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
14 Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W. 2d 81 (1953).
15 -----Tex ......... , 273 S.W. 2d 64 (1954).
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Whether the earlier cases have been overruled remains to be
seen. There remains an aura of doubt and uncertainty as well as
an area of doubt and uncertainty. The key would seem to be that
an allegation of small injury opens the "wide door," at least
insofar as flagrant conduct is involved. It is unfortunate the court
did not recognize the flagrant cases as a tort even though unaccompanied by physical harm. At any rate, the holding is distinctly a
progressive step toward eliminating the requirement that all injuries be in some way tied on to the conventional tort categories.1 6
MISREPRESENTATION

Ever since the leading English case of Peek v. Gurney 7 a problem in a misrepresentation case has been to whom the misrepresentor will be liable. A case on this point that should excite legal
scholars was recently decided by the Texas court.' There a real
estate developer promised A he would landscape and beautify
land opposite his lots. B was standing nearby and heard this.
Relying on this information, B bought a lot from the developer,
and instituted suit when the developer erected business buildings
instead. Held, since the developer intended only A to act on the
misrepresentation, he is liable only to A. Someone making a
representation is accountable for its truth only to the very person
whom he seeks to influence; no one else has a right to rely on it.' 9
Actually, the rule is based on policy rather than legal logic. The
number of persons who might hear of the representation and act
on it might be enormous and damages would be entirely out of
proportion to the degree of fault. Accordingly it is usually held
that there is no "transferred intent" in deceit cases.2" But Dean
Keeton suggests that a better view would hold the misrepresentor
liable to those whom he could reasonably expect to rely on the
statement. 21 Dean Keeton believes that a subjective test as to
intent of the misrepresentor necessarily involves difficult prob10 See Prosser: Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering; a New Tort, 37 MICH. L.
REv. 874 (1939).
17 6 Eng. & Ir. App. 377 (1873).
267 S.W. 2d 544 (1954).
Is Westcliff v. Wall-........... Tex -------------10 2 COOLEY ON TORTS § 358 (4th ed. 1932).
20 Accord: RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 531.
21 Keeton: The Ambit of a Fraudulent Representor's Responsibility, 17 TEXAS L.
REv. 1 (1939).
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lems of proof. He also suggests the true reason for limiting liability is the difficulty of disproving reliance.
The early case of Derry v. Peek22 held that deceit will not lie
unless the statement is made with the knowledge that it is false,
without belief in its truth, or recklessly. Perhaps the majority of
American courts accept the Derry case in name, but there has
been much "judicial whittling" at the doctrine. In Texas, for example, negligence supplies the required scienter.2" New Mexico
recently had occasion to align itself with the increasing number
of states that impose liability for either innocent or negligent
misrepresentations in Ham v. Hart.2 4 The defendant in that case
did not make the misrepresentation knowingly, but spoke as of
his own knowledge that a water well produced two gallons per
minute (it actually only produced 1/2 gallon per minute). In
sweeping language the court extended the doctrine of innocent
misrepresentation from merely allowing rescission for it to awarding damages suffered therefrom, saying that good faith is immaterial if the plaintiff relies on the statement to his detriment. A
person may not speak with "reckless disregard for the truth."
Most legal writers attach little significance to whether the action
is brought in negligence or deceit, so long as some sort of redress
is provided. Procedural difficulties remain, however.2 5
Can the plaintiff rely on the misrepresentation without any independent investigation on his own part? Yes, unless such reliance
becomes foolhardy. The Oklahoma court so held in Greene v.
Humphrey,2 6 stating that the plaintiff is not precluded from recovery due to the fact that he had an opportunity to investigate the
truth but did not do so. In holding that there is no duty to investigate the defect unless patently obvious, the court is squarely in
line with the magic "majority rule."2 7
22

14 A.C. 337, 58 L.J. Ch. 864 (1889).

23 See Seale v. Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 7 S.W. 742 (1888), which is still followed in

rexas.
N. M ...273 P. 2d 748 (1954).
25 See Bohlen: Should Negligent Misrepresentations be Treated as Negligence or
Fraud? 18 VA. L. REv. 703 (1932). Also 19 VA. L. REv. 742 (1933).
26 ----.-..-.-Okla ... ,274 P. 2d 535 (1954).
27Accord: Bishop v. E. A. Strout Realty Agency, Inc., 182 F. 2d 503 (4th Cir. 1950).
24 --------
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CONVERSION

Conversion traditionally has meant interfering with or controlling a chattel of another, i.e., acting like an owner when you
are not the owner. A recent Arkansas case carried this concept to
an extreme.2" The plaintiff, owner of a store, disappeared with
$3,000 cash. His wife met with creditors of the store and agreed
to run the business until all debts were paid. She made token
payments from time to time, totaling $338. Several years later
the husband returned, claiming amnesia. Due to careless bookkeeping by the wife, the accounts were then worthless. The husband
sued the creditors on the novel theory that his wife had become
the agent of the creditors and that, therefore, a constructive conversion of his book accounts took place due to the exercise of
dominion over the accounts by the wife. The creditors, as principals, were held liable for $5,000, and could find little solace
in being allowed to retain the worthless accounts.
Granted that a book account may be a proper subject of conversion," and that there may be a "constructive conversion" (as
by locking a door on someone's chattel), still the decision deeply
offends one's sense of justice. Why could not the court have found
the plaintiff impliedly consented to his wife's taking over the
accounts? Consent is a complete defense to an action for conversion, and consent is more readily implied in emergencies such
as existed here than in normal situations. And before a masterservant relationship exists, there must be found that the conduct
of the servant is subject to the control, or right to control, of the
master.8 The act of the defendants does not come under any of
the traditional ways of committing conversion. 1 At least the court
is not completely hostile to creditors, as witnessed by three separate vigorous dissents.
NEGLIGENCE

Traditionally the concept of negligence has been confined to
four distinct elements: (1) a duty to conform to a standard of
Plunkett-Jarrell Grocery v. Terry-.......... Ark ............. 263 S.W. 2d 229 (1954).
Accord: Englehart v. Sage, 73 Mont. 139, 235 Pac. 767 (1925), involving conversion of a debt.
80 FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AcFrcy, § 39 (Ist ed. 1954).
81
See PROSSER ON TORTS, pp. 94-111 (1st ed. 1941).
28
29

1955]

SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1954

251

conduct to protect others against unreasonable risks, (2) breach
of that duty, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the
injury, and (4) actual damage. Each of the four elements is extremely important. One of the most interesting cases decided last
year was concerned with the first element, viz., duty. Truck driver
A signalled with his rear lights for driver B to pass him. At the
time driver A had on his dim lights and could see but twenty-five
feet ahead. Driver B swung over to pass and hit the plaintiff, a
pedestrian. Held, driver A may properly be found negligent for
failure to have his bright lights on and subsequently signalling another to pass him. 2 "One who assumes to act, even if gratuitously,
may thereby become subject to a duty to act carefully, if he acts at
all.""8 The case is analagous to the situation where a railroad has
made a practice of stationing a flagman at a certain crossing, and
when it fails to do so on one occasion is held liable to the motorist
who has relied on the absence of warning. 4 Driver A's duty to
the pedestrian was twofold: to drive carefully himself, and to
avoid any affirmative act which would increase the pedestrian's
danger. For breach of the second duty, driver A was held liable.
Troublesome problems arise as to just when a particular risk
terminates. There are numerous cases holding that there is no
liability for negligence on the part of a contractor when he has
completed his work and it has been accepted by the party for
whom it was done. Usually the reason given is that there is no
privity of contract between the plaintiff, injured by the negligence
of the contractor, and the contractor, or the intervening negligence
of the party for whom the work was done insulated the contractor
from liability to users of the contractor's work. In line with this
view, the Arkansas court, in Reynolds v. Manley,"8 held that a
road contractor was not liable in negligence to a car owner, after
the contractor had completed the work and the state had accepted
it, even though the car owner's injury is the proximate result of
the contractor's failure to properly carry out his contract with the
state (ruts and chugholes in road), unless the defect in construcHaralson v. Jones Truck Line -..........
Ark-------------270 S.W. 2d 892 (1954).
Cardozo in Glanzer v. Shephard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
84 Erie R. Co. v. Stewart, 40 F. 2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930). See another twist to the
misfeasance theory in Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1925).
-5 .-Ark ..-..........
265 S.W. 2d 714 (1954).
32
33
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tion is so concealed that it could not have been detected after
reasonable inspection. The true reason for decisions of this type
is that courts realize they must terminate liability at some point,
and they have arbitrarily chosen the point at which the work has
been accepted by another.
The decision is out-of-step with the trend in a closely allied
field-the "supplier-of-chattels" cases. There is a fast-growing
tendency to cast words like "inherently dangerous to human life"
into the legal ash-can and hold the manufacturer liable for negligently made chattels, without much regard as to whether the
article is "inherently dangerous." 3 6 And there are cases holding
a contractor on the same footing as manufacturers. 7 There is
good reason to suspect that a contractor will be liable to third
persons after completion of his work and acceptance by the obligee
in simple negligence without regard to such impressive phrases
as "inherently dangerous" in the very near future. Foreseeability
of harm will become the criterion, not the nature of the chattel.
In general, the owner of land is not liable to trespassers for
harm caused by his failure to keep the land in a safe condition;
nor is he under a duty to carry on his activities so as not to
endanger them." A nebulous, fine line marks the boundary line
between a trespasser and a licensee, the latter being on the land
with the express or implied consent of the owner. But a person
may be a licensee or invitee as to a certain area of the land and a
trespasser as to another. In Burton Construction & Shipbuilding
Co., Inc. v. Broussard,9 an ex-employee was an invitee as to entering a shed and removing his belongings, but he became a naked
trespasser when he ventured 123 feet farther on the land to talk
to a watchman. When paint fumes exploded and injured him in the
latter area, the owner was held not liable. The owner did not
owe the ex-employee even the duty of ordinary care, since the
owner could not have reasonably anticipated that the ex-employee
would enter the dangerous area. The owner would be liable to a
trespasser only for willful, wanton acts, or for gross negligence.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
See Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill.
78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928).
88Accord: RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 333.
3
Tex ...........
273 S.W .2d 598 (1954).
86
37
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It is ironical to note that the owner would be liable to someone
walking down the street who might be injured by the blast under
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,' yet completely absolved of
duty toward an ex.employee on the premises talking to his watchman. It has been suggested that the reason for refusing to thrust
any duty on the owner toward a trespasser is that the latter is contributorily negligent, or should not be able to recover for his own
wrong. The better reason seems to be that it is sound policy to let
a man use his own land as he sees fit without having to be on the
lookout for intruders. Whatever the reason, the principal case is
clearly in line with the overwhelming majority of courts.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE

Contributory negligence has been defined as conduct on the
part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection."1 Many courts explain
that the plaintiff's negligence is an intervening or insulating cause
between the defendant's negligence and the result. Since the Industrial Revolution the defense of contributory negligence has been
looked on with increasing disfavor. Ingenious devices have been
invented to modify the doctrine. One of these is the "last clear
chance" rule, which allows the plaintiff to recover even if he has
been negligent himself if, just prior to the accident, the defendant
had the superior opportunity to prevent it. The doctrine is generally recognized where the plaintiff is helpless to avoid the harm
due to his prior negligence and the defendant, by using proper
care, could have discovered the plaintiff in time to avoid harming
him. The doctrine generally is not recognized where both parties
were merely "inattentive." But the New Mexico court abolished
the doctrine of contributory negligence for all practical purposes
in Merrill v. Stringer.2 The court held the "last clear chance"
doctrine may apply even where the plaintiff's negligence continued up to the time of the accident and the plaintiff could have
extricated himself from his position of peril but was inattentive,
40 L.R. 1 Ex. 265, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1886).
See Bohlen: The rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher, 59 PA. L. REV. 298 (1911). And c.f. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W. 2d
221, 20 TEXAs L. REv. 399.

41 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
42

463.

..........-N. M -------------271 P. 2d 405 (1954).
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if the defendant should have seen the danger and could have
avoided the accident if he had seen the danger. "Plaintiffs' lawyers" will immediately recognize the tremendous significance in
each phrase of the new doctrine. Such a broad concept has not
yet been adopted elsewhere.
Many states have adopted a variation of the "last clear chance"
rule in the form of the "discovered peril" doctrine. Under this
approach the defendant must have discovered both the plaintiff
and the peril, and the defendant must have had a chance to avoid
the accident. This is the prevailing view in Texas4" and Arkansas. 4
Devices akin to the defense of contributory negligence remain,
however, for the use and protection of the defendant, such as the
fiction of "imputed" negligence. The fiction is employed with
particular relish in most community property states, the theory
being to prevent a negligent spouse from profiting as community
owner for his own wrong. "Imputed" negligence in Texas is carried
to an extreme: in a joint enterprise, negligence is imputed to all
with a common purpose who have an equal right to control the
vehicle; the negligence of the husband is imputed to the wife;
the negligence of the bailee is imputed to the bailor to bar the
latter's recovery; the negligence of the parent is imputed to the
infant if the infant dies as a result of his injuries (due to peculiar
wording in the death statute)." An Oklahoma case, Muenzler v.
Phillips,4" however, has gone to the opposite extreme. In that
state, the negligence of the driver-husband is not imputed to the
passenger-wife.47 The wife, however, is within the rule requiring
a guest to use ordinary care for his or her safety. In the Muenzler
case the husband drove into a dangerous intersection without
slackening his speed. There was high shrubbery on both sides of the
road. The wife just sat and looked straight ahead without comment
as to the reckless driving. Held, the question of the wife's negligence is entirely for the jury. Apparently the passenger-wife must
do some affirmative negligent act, e.g., kicking her husband in
4' See Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Napier, 143 S.W. 2d 754 (1940).
44See 1 ARK. L. REv. 13 and generally 63 HAnv. L. REv. 769.
4' See generally 26 TEXAS L. REv. 461.
46 -------Okla-............ 276 P. 2d 221 (1954).
4 Stillwater Milling Co. v. Templin, 182 Okla. 309, 77 P. 2d 732 (1938,.
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the shins or grabbing the wheel, before the court will rule as a
matter of law that she has been negligent herself.
Probably none of the four elements of negligence excites the
imagination of a student of the law more than the element of
proximate cause and causation in fact. Where two causes concur
to cause damage, many courts have adopted the "but for" rule,
i.e., the defendant's conduct is not a cause if the event would
have occurred without it. But where two causes concur to bring
about an event, and either of them alone would have been enough
to cause the same result, another test is needed. Suppose the
defendant sets a fire which merges with a fire from another source;
the combined fires burn the plaintiff's property, but either fire
alone would have done the damage. Most courts would say the
defendant's conduct was a substantialfactor in injuring the plaintiff and hold him liable for the entire damage (jointly and severally). The Louisiana court apparently applied the latter test without identifying it by name in Brantley v. Tremont & Gulf Railway
Co.,4 8 which involved an action by a seller of bait against the
railroad for cutting open a dam and letting his minnows escape.
The seller of bait had a lease on the pond which housed the minnows. Heavy rains prompted railroad officials to cut the dam to
prevent further damage to a nearby railroad embankment. The
heavy rains continued after the cutting of the dam, however, and
the railroad contended that the seller of bait would have sustained
his loss anyway due to the more than seven inches of rainfall.
Held, the action of the railroad was a substantial factor in causing
the damage and the seller may recover for the entire damage,
unmitigated by the damage which the subsequent rain would have
caused anyway. 9
CONCLUSION

A careful digest of the leading tort cases for 1954 inevitably
leads to the conclusion that the law in this field is undergoing a
subtle transformation. The common law defenses are gradually
4

_.

La._.

75 S. 2d 236 (1954).

49 The Texas cases, however, have gone to an extreme in finding the damages
capable of some sort of apportionment. See Texas Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Lovejoy,
138 S.W. 2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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being shunted aside, and, to a certain extent, being replaced with
doctrines long promulgated by "social engineers." A second consideration, however, will reveal latent dangers lurking beneath
the surface. The courts may find more problems inherent in their
"solutions" than they anticipated.

Lee V. Williams. Jr.

